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THE PROBLEM OF «DOUBLE» AND «HIDDEN» 
VETO POWER IN SECURITY COUNSEL 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESS
T�e veto question is one of t�e most controversial problems facing 
t�e United Nations. T�e veto �as always loomed over t�e work of t�e 
UN Security Council. T�e possibility of permanent members to use 
«�idden» veto and «double» veto is partly responsible for some of t�e 
most tragic failures in t�e sixty-year �istory of t�e United Nations.
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T�e voting arrangements in t�e Security Council resulted from 
a compromise between t�e United States, t�e Soviet Union and 
t�e United Kingdom, at t�e conference of �alta in February 1945. 
T�ese proposals subjected voting in t�e Council to unanimity of t�e 
permanent members, wit� regard to bot� enforcement action and t�e 
peaceful settlement of disputes, alt�oug� in t�e latter case States parties 
to t�e dispute could abstain. T�e �alta formula, emerged from t�e 
�alta Conference, introduced t�e prospect of t�e «double» veto, w�ic� 
meant t�at any «decision regarding t�e preliminary question must be 
taken by vote of 9 members of SC, including t�e concurring vote of 
t�e permanent members: USA, USSR, �B, C�ina and France» [5, P. 
8]. T�erefore, t�e «double» veto was distinguis�ed as device by w�ic� 
a permanent member of t�e Security Council may, by deploying two 
successive vetoes, prevent any substantive decision being taken.
During t�e negotiations at t�e San Francisco Conference 
(25 April – 26 June 1945), numerous small and medium-sized States 
protested against t�e privileged status of t�e five permanent members 
as a form of victors’ justice and an unacceptable infringement on t�e 
sovereign equality of States. Nevert�eless, t�e P-5 made it clear t�at t�e 
complete and unconditional acceptance of t�e permanent members�ip 
and t�e veto power was a condition sine qua non for t�eir participation. 
T�e San Francisco Declaration states t�at t�e veto cannot be used to 
prevent t�e Council from considering and discussing a dispute or a 
situation. However, regarding t�e difference between procedural and 
non-procedural matters, t�ere is a possibility, t�at a permanent member 
would ask for a preliminary vote on t�e nature of a question and 
consequently veto it. T�us, t�e Declaration will be unacceptable for t�e 
rest of t�e national delegations [6, P. 7]. T�e text was not incorporated 
in or attac�ed to t�e UN C�arter.
T�e veto power provided in Article 27, para. 3 of t�e C�arter, can 
be exercised w�en a decision is not merely procedural but concerns a 
«substantive» issue. Wit� regard to decisions of a procedural nature, 
Article 27, para 2, provides t�at t�ey s�all be made by affirmative vote 
of any nine members of t�e Council. T�e problem of «double» veto 
is w�et�er a preliminary question according to t�e provision of para. 
2 of Article 27, w�ic� excludes t�e rig�t of veto, or according to t�e 
provision of para. 3, w�ic� allows it [1, P. 70]. On 14 April 1949, t�e 
�eneral Assembly adopted a resolution giving its opinion on w�ic� 
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questions s�ould be considered as procedural. T�e resolution states t�at 
procedural questions are:
– t�e submission to t�e �A of any question relating to t�e 
maintenance of peace;
– a request to t�e S� for t�e convocation of a special session of 
t�e �A;
– t�e approval of credentials;
– t�e establis�ment of subsidiary organs;
– decisions on t�e rules of procedure;
– questions concerning t�e agenda;
– invitations to states to participate in SC debates.
Notwit�standing t�ese clarifications, disagreement may still arise 
as to w�et�er or not a particular proposal is procedural [3, P. 560]. 
T�e controversy about t�e «double» veto is still unresolved today. 
W�ereas t�e UN C�arter itself suggests t�at t�e preliminary question 
on t�e procedural nature of a decision, w�ic� requires t�e concurring 
votes of t�e P-5, is only intended for cases of doubt, it’s not clear. 
T�eoretically, eac� can keep t�e council from even taking up a matter it 
finds objectionable [2, P. 129].
In practice, t�e «double» veto problem �as mainly arisen wit� 
regard to proposals to establis� subsidiary organs for carrying out 
studies or investigations, w�en it could be argued t�at suc� a decision 
mig�t eventually require t�e Council to take enforcement action. It 
may be remarked, t�at every time Soviet Union exercised t�e «double» 
veto (t�e state, w�ic� exercised t�e veto power most frequently), it was 
supported by one or more of t�e permanent members in t�e vote on 
t�e preliminary question: in Spanis� question, by France; in Albanian 
question, by C�ina, France and �reat Britain.
T�e «double» veto not only jeopardizes t�e systemic consistency 
of t�e C�arter, but at t�e same time it is extremely detrimental to t�e 
universal acceptance, legitimacy and implementation of United Nations 
resolutions [7, P. 22]. It creates a situation t�at virtually offers t�e 
permanent members a total «immunity» w�en pursuing aggressive 
strategies. T�ey enjoy special procedural protection by using t�e UN 
C�arter for t�eir own purposes. T�e «double» veto is a logical and, in 
a sense, inevitable consequence of t�e voting rule embodied in Article 
27 of t�e C�arter.
T�e use of t�e so-called «hidden» veto means t�at a permanent 
member t�reatens to use its veto if a certain measure or statement is put 
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to t�e vote. T�e «�idden» veto is used mainly in closed-door informal 
consultations, rat�er t�an in open meetings, w�ic� makes it extremely 
difficult to gain information on its use and assess its effect on t�e work 
of t�e Security Council [6, P. 8].
More importantly, t�e t�reat of permanent members to use t�e 
veto (t�e «�idden» veto) is partly responsible for some of t�e �eavy 
mistakes in �istory of t�e United Nations. T�e most obvious example 
relates to t�e 1994 Rwandan genocide, w�ic� lasted for four mont�s 
and left 800, 000 people dead. W�en t�e Security Council considered 
t�e possibility of intervening to �alt t�e massacres, two permanent 
members, France and t�e United States (t�e latter partially motivated 
by t�e loss of 18 soldiers in Somalia in 1993) blocked t�e establis�ment 
of a robust intervention force. UN actions taken against Israel are one 
example on U. S. «�idden» vetoes constantly t�reatening to undermine 
t�e work of resolutions on t�e Arab-Israel conflict.
Because of t�e use or t�reat of t�e veto, t�e Security Council 
could at best �ave a limited role in certain wars and interventions in 
w�ic� its Permanent Members were involved – for example in Algeria 
(1954–62); Suez (1956), Hungary (1956), Vietnam (1946–75), t�e 
Sino-Vietnamese war (1979), Afg�anistan (1979–88), Panama (1989), 
Iraq (2003), and �eorgia (2008).
Since t�e t�reats are not issued formally, it is impossible to count 
t�e number of «�idden» vetoes used in order to block decisions against 
t�e will of ot�er Council members. T�e will of ac�ieving consensus 
means t�e �idden veto plays a �ig�ly strategic roll even among t�e 
permanent members. Before presenting an arrangement to t�e Council, 
t�ey often consult eac� ot�er on important matters and try to strike a 
deal beneficial to t�em all [4, P. 46].
In t�e �istory of t�e Security Council, almost �alf t�e vetoes were 
cast by t�e Soviet Union, wit� t�e vast majority of t�ose being before 
1965. United States �as used t�e veto on 82 occasions between 1946 and 
2007; and since 1972, it �as used its veto power more t�an any ot�er 
permanent member �as. Sometimes working wit� veto power could 
be extremely inefficient to coming up wit� a resolution. P-5 nations 
provide t�eir national interests in t�e first place. T�ey see events in 
t�e world t�roug� exactly t�e prism of t�eir own interests. W�en t�ey 
apply veto, t�ey t�ink about t�emselves and t�eir own power not of t�e 
international community. T�ese mec�anisms only simplify t�is task. So, 
t�e «double» veto and «�idden» veto power is not t�e cause but t�e 
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reflex of t�e pattern of international politics w�ic� �as prevailed for 
centuries. Trying to get rid of t�e veto is like trying to get rid of politics, 
but United Nations s�ould keep searc�ing t�e tools to prevent suc� 
negative events, as t�ey can be t�e serious obstruction for maintenance 
of t�e core function of United Nations – making peace and security.
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